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DIGEST OF RECENT U.S. CASES
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NEW JERSEY ABSOLUTE
LIABILITY STATUTE
Prentiss v. National Airlines
Gizzi v. American Airlines
112 F. Supp, 306 (D.C. N.J. May 13, 1953)
The question presented is the constitutionality of a New Jersey statute
which imposes absolute liability upon the owner of aircraft for injuries to
persons or property "'caused by ascent, descent, or flight of the aircraft...
whether such owner was negligent or not, unless the injury is caused in
whole or in part by the negligence of the person injured, or of the owner or
bailee of the property injured.'" [p. 308, citing N.J.S. c. 237, §1 (1946) ] It
was argued on behalf of the airlines that making owners absolutely liable
for damage caused by their aircraft, in effect, takes their property without
due process of law.
The district court points out that the underlying purpose of the statute
"was to place the cost of the damage of the enterprise upon the industry
itself.., rather than upon a completely innocent .third party.. ." [p. 310]
This liability applies only "'to persons or property on the land or water
beneath,'" not airline passengers, and "is recognized today as due process
of law." [p. 310, citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), and City of
Chicago v. Sturgis, 222 U.S. 313 (1911)] The court indicates that New
Jersey was justified in imposing absolute liability upon the airlines because
of their "ultrahazardous" operations and because of the difficulty a plaintiff
would have in showing the cause of an airplane crash and thus proving
negligence on the part of the airline. [Citing E. C. SWEENEY, IS SPECIAL
AVIATION LIABILITY ESSENTIAL?, 19 J.A.L. & C. 166, 167 (1952)]
The court also rejects the contention that this statute in any way con-
stitutes an invalid restraint upon interstate commerce; its effect, says the
court, "is indirect and casual." [p. 314]
GOVERNMENT GRANTED TAXI MONOPOLY AT
ALASKA AIRPORT
Patton v. Administrator of Civil Aeronautics,
112 F. Supp. 817 (D.C. Alaska June 17, 1953)
Plaintiff, operator of a bus service for tourists who come to Alaska,
sought to enjoin the enforcement of a regulation issued by the Administra-
tor of Civil Aeronautics, which regulation gave the Yellow Cab Company
the exclusive right to pick-up passengers at the Fairbanks International
Airport. Plaintiff contends that this regulation creates a monopoly for the
Cab Company and violates Section 1 of the 14th Amendment of the United
States Constitution.
The district court granted the Administrator's motion to dismiss the
petition for want of jurisdiction, because the Administrator, said the court,
did not exceed his authority in issuing this regulation. The monopoly created
here is legal, and Section 1 of the 14th Amendment is no bar to the exercise
of the rule-making power delegated by Congress in regard to property
belonging to the United States.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
CAB ORDER PLACING LIMITATIONS UPON DISMISSAL
ALLOWANCES AND SETTING UP ARBITRATION
PROCEDURE
Danielson v. CAB,
204 F. 2d 266 (CCA 2nd Cir. May 8, 1953)
This action arose on a petition of the Secretary of the Association of
Air Navigators to the CAB in regard to a merger between Pan American
and American Overseas Airways' The Board had provided as a condition
of its approval that PAA must compensate those employees adversely affected
by the merger. The Air Navigators' representative sought: 1) a Board order
compelling PAA to pay dismissal allowances to 9 former AOA navigators,
and 2) a finding that in computing dismissal allowances of 30 other AOA
navigators, overtime pay earned during the period for which dismissal
allowances were payable should not be deducted. The Board refused to grant
either request.
The 9 AOA navigators for whom the Association requested dismissal
allowances were on furlough at the time of the merger, and the Board ruled
that although they were entitled to protective benefits, they must first show
that they were adversely affected by the merger. The Board established an
arbitration procedure by which they could establish their loss. This pro-
cedure is still available to them and is, the court held, an adequate means
for them to establish their claims for compensation.
In regard to the deduction of overtime pay from the dismissal allow-
ances of 30 other former AOA navigators, the Board's order was not
intended, said the court, to give them as much pay or as good a job as they
would have had if the merger had never occured. They were to continue
receiving a monthly income "equal to that which [they] had received prior
to the acquisition;" thus other income earned during the period for which
dismissal allowances were payable should be deducted. [p. 268]
MANDAMUS AGAINST DISTRICT COURT - CONSPIRACY
AMONG AIR FREIGHT COMPETITORS
American Airlines v. Forman
Slick Airways v. American Airlines
204 F. 2d 230 (CCA 3rd Cir. April 8, 1953)
Plaintiff (Slick Airways) alleges injury caused by a conspiracy among
its competitors to drive it out of the air freight business. The defense
raised, by way of motion to dismiss, was that the 'district court could not
adjudicate this case on its merits without encroaching upon the primary
jurisdiction of the CAB. The district court denied the motion "without
prejudice to its renewal after answer and the more precise framing of the
actually contested issues through appropriate pre-trial procedure." [p. 231]
The defendants appealed this order and filed a "'Petition for Writ of
Certiorari or Mandamus or Prohibition'" seeking to have the district court
restrained from going on with the anti-trust action. [p. 231]
The court of appeals held that although the district court refused to stop
the proceedings at this stage, that court made it clear that the jurisdictional
issue could be raised again "after pre-trial clarification of the issues."
[p. 232]
Mandamus or prohibition, said the court, is sought here as another way
of obtaining immediate review of an interlocutory order which can be re-
viewed as effectively by appeal from the district court's final decision in the
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suit. In order to justify resort to an extraordinary writ such as is sought
here, "the challenged assumption or denial of jurisdiction must be so plainly
wrong as to indicate failure to comprehend or refusal to be guided by un-
ambiguous provisions of a statute or settled common law doctrine." [p. 232]
BREACH OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT AND INDUCING
A BREACH AS SEPARATE CAUSES OF ACTION
FOR DIVERSITY PURPOSES
Allison v. American Airlines,
112 F. Supp. 37 (D.C. Okla. April 14, 1953)
Plaintiff sues airline and one of its employees, Anderson, charging the
airline with breach of a contract of employment, and Anderson with induc-
ing the breach and interfering with plaintiff's business relations. Plaintiff
now moves to remand the case to the state court since both the plaintiff and
Anderson are citizens of Oklahoma.
The district court held that the ultimate decision as to whether there is
a cause of action against Anderson can be deferred, since jurisdiction can
be sustained on another ground. Two distinct causes of action were pleaded
here: a) breach of contract, and b) inducing a breach of contract, and this
case was properly removed, said the court, under 28 US CA §144 (c). An
employee may be justified in inducing his employer to breach a contract if
in good faith he believes that to do so would be in his employer's best
interest. Such a defense would not be available to the employer who breached
the contract.
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES PROVIDED BY
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BEFORE SUING CIVILLY
FOR DAMAGES -MISSOURI LAW
TWA v. Koppal,
73 S. Ct. 906 (June 1, 1953)
A TWA employee was suspended "on a charge of abuse of sick leave
provisions of his contract," and given a hearing in accordance with the
grievance procedure in his contract. [p. 907] He was asked to resign and
did so under protest, but instead of appealing the adverse ruling in accord-
ance with the contract procedure, he brought action in a district court for
damages. The district court set aside a favorable jury verdict and dismissed
the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as provided in
the employment contract.
The Supreme Court held that the Railway Labor Act "does not deprive
an employee of his right to sue his employer for an unlawful discharge ..."
[p. 910] The Adjustment Board does not have exclusive jurisdiction over
an employee's claim that he has been unlawfully discharged. But since
Missouri law, applicable to this contract, requires a showing that com-
plainant has exhausted his administrative remedies, an employee who fails
to do so must have his complaint dismissed. The district court's judgment
was affirmed, and that of the court of appeals (which reversed the district
court) reversed.
